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Abstract
In this paper we develop a stochastic endogenous growth model augmented with income
tax evasion. Our model avoids some existing discrepancies between empirical evidence and
theoretical predictions of traditional tax evasion models. Further, we show that: i) productive
government expenditures play an important role in a⁄ecting economy￿ s tax evasion rate; ii)
the average marginal income tax rate in Australia come close to the optimal; and iii) the
phenomenon of tax evasion is not an excuse for a productive government to advocate an excessive
income taxation.
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1"The hidden economy is a profound phenomenon of our times; however measured, however
de￿ned, our conclusion is common to all the authors who attempted to deal with it: the problem of
the hidden economy cannot be dismissed as quantitatively trivial."
￿Marrelli (1987)
1 Introduction
Income tax evasion, constituting a sizable share of underground economy, is a chronic problem in
virtually every country. For example, in the U.S. the fraction of income underreported is around
10 percent (Andreoni et al. (1998)), and this is comparable with the average estimates for leading
European economies and Australia (Gupta (2004), Hepburn (1992), Bajada (1999)). In less devel-
oped countries the problem of tax noncompliance is even more severe (Alm et al. (1993), Chen
(2003)). It is widely accepted among economists that income tax evasion leads to various forms of
welfare, public revenue and distributional losses, as well as serious ethical issues within a society
(Cullis and Jones (1998), Giles and Caragata (2001)). Furthermore, Bajada (2003) estimated that
the underground economy deepens recessions and increases the volatility of business cycles. It
undermines government policies intending to smooth cyclical ￿ uctuations in the economy. Thus,
studying income tax evasion phenomenon in more details posits a great interest.
In this paper we develop a stochastic endogenous growth model augmented with income tax
evasion and based on the neoclassical assumption of rational choice.1 We then fully calibrate the
model to some of the salient features of Australian economy.
One might argue that by modelling income tax evasion within an expected utility framework we
are shooting at our own legs. This is because main theoretical predictions of traditional rational-
choice models with tax evasion are inconsistent with existing empirical evidence. The inconsistencies
are as follows.
Inconsistency 1: Traditional theoretical models of income tax evasion predict that higher mar-
ginal tax rates on income encourage tax compliance (Yitzhaki￿ s (1974) puzzle);2
Inconsistency 2: Realistically calibrated tax evasion models predict that the extent of noncom-
pliance is huge, which is not what we observe in reality.3
The model we develop successfully avoids both inconsistencies, potentially allowing us to se-
riously consider its theoretical and policy implications. The ￿rst important feature of our model
is that it does not, unlike most tax evasion models, assume that the revenues collected by the
government simply disappear. That would have been in our opinion an unforgivable simpli￿cation.
1For the sake of tractability we consider a one-sector general-equilibrium model with government-taxpayer inter-
actions within an economic growth framework. For alternative non-growth models with di⁄erent possibilities for tax
evasion in two sectors refer to Kesselman (1989; 1993) and Jung et al. (1994).
2Although there are di⁄erences in modelling techniques and assumptions used, most empirical studies do suggest
a clear positive relationship between taxes and tax evasion (or hidden economy, in general). These studies are
Clotfelter (1983), Crane and Nourzad (1990), Alm, Bahl and Murray (1993), Giles and Caragata (2001), to name a
few. Nevertheless, in our opinion, Inconsistency 1 is still somewhat questionable since a few studies report a negative
association between taxes and tax evasion. Refer to Feinstein (1991) and Geeroms and Wilmots (1985), for example.
3For a thorough review of the problem refer to Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007).
2Government spending, ￿nanced by the revenues collected, can enhance economic activity indirectly
via externalities, or be as a direct input to private production. As was stated by Cowell and Gordon
(1988), "... while the government taketh away, it also giveth back, and the latter activity surely ex-
erts some in￿ uence on evasion". The quote should be especially relevant for Australia where public
spending traditionally is an important component of the economy. Kam and Wang (2008) show
that public capital has dominated the process of economic development in Australia. In addition,
despite a marked downward trend in the ratio of public investment to GDP, and given a rising
cost of public investment, Otto and Voss (1998) showed that there was no systematic evidence of
the resource misallocation in Australian public sector.4 Therefore, it is worth rigorously explor-
ing a possible theoretical link between government spending and tax noncompliance, highlighting
the implications for Australia. This is one of the aims of our paper. Further, given that public
spending is useful for private production, would it be optimal for the government to set a statutory
tax rate higher than the degree of the public spending externality in the presence of tax evasion?
According to Chen￿ s (2003) deterministic growth model, the answer is ￿ yes￿ . Our model answers
￿ not necessarily￿ .
It is worth mentioning, existing studies generally ignored the fact that while tax noncompliance
might generate ill-gotten bene￿ts to the taxpayer it also leads to a serious waste of resources in
the process, such as "shoe-leather" costs associated with evasion. Tax cheaters may also prefer to
shelter illegal gains from domestic ￿nancial institutions, and this may forgo interest payments and
cause investment misallocation. Costly evasion was previously considered by Usher (1982, 1986),
Cowell (1990), Kaplow (1990), Cremer and Gahvari (1994), Yaniv (1999), Chen (2003) and Bayer
and Sutter (2008). These models are mainly theoretical, except Bayer and Sutter￿ s study. Bayer
and Sutter quantify the impact of various policy instruments on the excess burden of tax evasion
in a rigorous experimental game-theoretic framework. Chen￿ s calibration exercise sheds some light
on the value of evasion costs in the context of East Asian economies. No such estimate is available
for Australia, and more importantly, to what extent these costs can mitigate the taxpayer￿ s evasion
incentives is an unanswered question. An insight into such incentives is essential. If costly evasion
successfully deters excessive noncompliance, the government might want to exercise some power
over it in order to discourage tax crimes. In our model we attempt to pin down the magnitude of
tax evasion costs in Australia, rather than assume its value exogenously.5
We now emphasize main features and implications of our model.
￿ We consider a stochastic growth environment, where a rise in the evasion and tax rates con-
tribute to the riskiness of the taxpayer￿ s budget constraint by a⁄ecting the latter￿ s variance
term. In such an environment, a typical risk-averse taxpayer￿ s aspirations towards noncom-
pliance are somewhat mitigated, potentially helping to reconcile Inconsistency 2. Note, in
deterministic models the interaction between taxes and evasion only partially capture the
riskiness associated with the evolution of the individual￿ s capital pro￿le;
￿ Although the deterministic growth model by Chen (2003) is a direct ancestor of ours in terms
of considering productive public sector and evasion costs, our model has two distinct features.
First, we are able to theoretically account for the role of public sector spending in explaining
tax evasion behavior. This is not possible in Chen￿ s model,6 (nor in a static model) and
4For a thorough review of the evidences on the role of the broad public infrastructure capital refer to Otto and
Voss (1995).
5Bayer and Sutter (2008) assume that fraction of income wasted in the process of tax noncompliance is 4 percent.
6In Chen￿ s deterministic continuous-time model there is no analytical solution to the evasion rate (refer to his
equation (7) with h0=0). Hence, it is not possible to rigorously isolate the mechanism according to which public
3this has not been analyzed in a similar manner previously.7 Thus, we contribute to the
understanding of the above quote by Cowell and Gordon (1988) regarding the role of public
revenues in explaining tax noncompliance. Second, in Chen￿ s study the welfare-maximizing
government must always increase the statutory tax rate beyond what is satis￿ed by the natural
e¢ ciency condition of government size (Barro￿ s (1990) natural e¢ ciency condition).8 Based
on an Australian example, our model predicts that the conventional output elasticity of public
input in production is generally a good rule-of-thumb to determine the growth-maximizing
tax rate. That is, even if there is some tax evasion, the government cannot use an e¢ ciency
argument as an excuse for a heavier statutory tax burden.
￿ Whilst most studies analyzed tax evasion phenomenon for the U.S. and Europe, we focus
on Australia. To the best of our knowledge, the welfare implications of the government tax
policy in the presence of tax evasion has not been analyzed for Australia within a general-
equilibrium growth model.9 Our study has two key predictions. First, given a realistic
calibration, the existing average marginal tax rate in Australia falls short (but only slightly
so) of the optimal one. In addition, our model predicts that given costly evasion, one should
not expect the noncompliance rate in Australia to rise signi￿cantly over about a quarter of
the true income.10
Welfare implications of our model are as follows. A cut in the tax rate, on the one hand, raises
the mean, after-tax return on taxpayers￿income and tends to stimulate growth via more private
capital accumulation. On the other hand, resulting lower tax collections suppress the output-
enhancing public spending. Further, a cut in the tax rate reduces the evasion rate (which alone
would, ceteris paribus, lower private capital holdings), but lower noncompliance would also reduce
the magnitude of wasteful resources associated with evasion. Hence, based on the latter argument
the net e⁄ect on growth will be ambiguous. Moreover, a low evasion rate helps the economy to
better capitalize on the government expenditure externalities, which will be growth-enhancing.
Finally, because of the stochastic nature of the taxpayer￿ s budget constraint in our model, both
tax and noncompliance rates further distort the taxpayer￿ s behavior. We see our simple model
creates a strong and complicated theoretical ambiguity between ￿scal policy and growth. There
is, therefore, no a priori reason to believe that a given decrease or increase in the tax rate will
be welfare-improving. Our benchmark parameterization and sensitivity analysis demonstrate that
initially the growth rate rises as the tax rate increases, reaching a maximum at a positive rate,
then decreases at higher tax rates. Our calibration exercise suggests the optimal marginal tax
revenues can exert any in￿ uence on tax evasion. Essentially, in Chen￿ s model public goods provision simply o⁄ers a
rationale for taxation.
7To our knowledge, the only other study to consider a role of public spending in non-compliance decision was
that of Cowell and Gordon (1988). However, their modeling is di⁄erent from ours as their static model assumes tax
revenues enter the utility of the taxpayer in a particular way.
8This is even true if the cost of administering the tax system in Chen￿ s model is set to zero to be consistent with
our setting (see expression (17) in Chen).
9We want to emphasize our main goal to analyze tax evasion behavior within a realistic but tractable calibrated
general-equilibrium model. In the calibration exercise we try to capture the structure of evasion process in Australia
by using available parameter values. We are, however, aware of the disagreement on the extent of tax evasion in the
country (Breusch (2005)), so our numerical exercise should not be treated as an estimation of Australian tax evasion.
Comprehensively reconciling the disagreement would go considerably beyond the scope of our study.
10We do not model in this study the costs associated with tax administration. One simple way to do so would be
to assume these costs erode a fraction of public revenues, which might suggest higher optimal tax rates in order to
￿nance a given government expenditure. In a more complicated scenario, reducing the cost of administering the tax
system by lowering the audit rate should free up some resources which would help to reduce the budgetary burden
and could then allow for a cut in the tax rate (Kolm (1973), Baldry (1984)).
4rate in Australia should be just a few percentage points lower than the present rate. It is worth
noting, however, our numerical example is ￿t to our analytical model which abstracts from some
important real-world extensions in order not to lose analytical tractability. Thus, one might treat
our numerical results as somewhat illustrative. Indeed, the precise welfare analysis of any tax
policy change would obviously remain wide open for empirical debates (and perhaps even more
so in an endogenous growth framework). A more realistic welfare study would thus require quite
complicated general-equilibrium simulations (but with fewer analytical propositions), encompassing
more than one sector and certainly allowing for endogeneity in labour supply decisions.11
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We ￿rst very brie￿ y revisit a static Allingham-
Sandmo-Yitzhaki model of tax evasion to stress its main inconsistencies once more. We show that
even if one assumes income-enhancing government spending in the static framework, the evasion
rate in the economy is not going to be a⁄ected. In the next section it will become clear this is not
the case when public spending externalities are introduced in a general equilibrium dynamic model.
We start by developing a general model with convex evasion costs. We then temporarily disregard
the costs to draw a consistent parallel with static models. Calibrating our model con￿rms some of
the salient features of Australian economy. Further, having analyzed the implications for optimal
taxation and the magnitude of evasion costs, we conclude the paper with some critical remarks and
caveats.
2 Modeling Tax Evasion
2.1 A Static model: Inconsistency 1, Inconsistency 2 and the irrelevance of
government spending
In static models the output-enhancing government revenue does not play a role in in￿ uencing
the evasion rate of a representative taxpayer. To see this consider ￿rst a simple environment in
the spirit of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974), where a rational taxpayer with
income, y, chooses a fraction of income, e 2 (0;1), to hide from the government. The latter
imposes a constant marginal tax rate, ￿ 2 (0;1), on any declared income. The government detects
the taxpayer with probability ￿ 2 (0;1),12 and upon catching the evader, imposes a penalty on the
amount of undeclared taxes. The penalty is given by the parameter ￿ ￿ 1 + s, where s > 0 is the
surcharge rate. The random return on a unit of evaded tax, r, is 1 with probability 1￿￿, and 1￿￿
with probability ￿. Thus, E[r] ￿ r = 1￿￿￿ and is assumed to be positive, with E standing for the
expectation operator.
The taxpayer￿ s preferences are represented by a standard isoelastic utility function where for





11For a broad role of tax policies within a general-equilibrium framework, refer, for instance, to Creedy (1997).
12Sometimes ￿ is interpreted as the taxpayer￿ s subjective evaluation of the probability of getting caught. Certainly,
objective and perceived detection probabilities do not have to be the same but to be consistent with most studies in
this line of research we treat them as if they are.
13In dynamic applications to follow, setting the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution to 1 is broadly
consistent with Attanasio (1999), who argues: "the evidence that emerges from the micro studies which use an
isoelastic speci￿cation of preferences is that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption (EIS) is
just below 1." Furthermore, if the income e⁄ect and substitution e⁄ect on saving does exactly o⁄set in dynamic
applications, such an assumption will be a reasonable abstraction as the relationship between saving and the interest
rate is empirically debatable (CaballØ and PanadØs (2000)).
5where consumption, c, is a random variable:
c = (1 ￿ ￿)y + r￿ey: (2)
The solution to the above program yields the optimal evasion pro￿le, given by:
e =
(￿ ￿ 1)(￿￿ ￿ 1)
￿ (￿ ￿ 1)
: (3)
Expression (3) leads to the following remark.14
Remark 1 Existence of income enhancing public input does not have any impact on the evasion
rate.
Indeed, note government revenues are equal to
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ e)￿y + ￿ (￿￿ (y ￿ (1 ￿ e)y) + (1 ￿ e)￿y)
= ￿y (1 ￿ e(1 ￿ ￿￿)) = (1 ￿ re)￿y: (4)
Clearly, government revenue collections depend on the noncompliance rate. Now, assume the
revenues, once collected, are directed to ￿nance expenditures enhancing the income level, y. Es-
sentially, that means y is an implicit function of (1 ￿ re)￿y. Since the ￿rst-order conditions in the
taxpayer maximization problem cancel any e⁄ect of income, y, on the choice variable, e, the fact
that income is endogenous is irrelevant for the taxpayer in a large economy. Not only will Yitzhaki￿ s
puzzle be unsettled, but essentially two drastically di⁄erent economies with di⁄erent e⁄ects of ￿scal
spending will have similar consequences for people￿ s tax evasion incentives. These results, however,
are sensitive to the model speci￿cation. Thus, we next consider a continuous-time stochastic model
to see that the implications are, indeed, drastically di⁄erent from the static case.
2.2 Tax evasion in a stochastic growth model with productive government
spending
2.2.1 A case with a costly and costless evasion
Consider a household-producer who has an access to the following aggregate production function







where 0 < ￿ < 1, and g(t) is the amount of public services available to each household-producer.
That is, we assume the government provides services to private sector without charging user fees,
and these public services increase the marginal product of private capital. Examples of productive
public spending include the government expenditure on infrastructure, research and development
14Here a reader would recall Inconsistency 1 mentioned earlier. One can di⁄erentiate (3) with respect to ￿ to
con￿rm it. Intuitively, when ￿nes are imposed on the amount of concealed taxes, a change in the tax rate increases
expected penalties and the marginal bene￿t of cheating proportionally, rendering the substitution e⁄ect zero. Recall
we are considering logarithmic preferences, which exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion, meaning that the optimal
dollar amount invested in risky assets will be an increasing function of wealth. Since a rise in the tax rate means a
negative wealth e⁄ect, the taxpayer would want to reduce the optimal amount of undeclared income. With income
being constant, the only way to do it is to reduce the fraction to hide, e. Further, for arguments￿sake assuming
￿ =0.30, ￿ =3%, and ￿ =1.5 would lead to an absurdly high evasion rate, con￿rming Inconsistency 2.
6and education, to name just a few. We assume, like Barro (1990) does, the services are not subject
to congestion e⁄ects. Hence, for the sake of simplicity we do not explicitly model congestion with
varying degrees of non-rivalry and non-exclusiveness as in Kam and Wang (2008), for instance.
Note the amount of productive government services can be represented as






where ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ re(t))￿ is the e⁄ective tax rate as in (4) and e(t) is the fraction of income concealed
at time t. If e(t) = 0, the e⁄ective tax rate is the same as the statutory tax rate, ￿. From (6) it is





Consequently, expression (5) can be presented as





Assume tax evasion involves costs described by the function ￿e2 (t), ￿ > 0.15 As was stated
previously, tax evasion involves a variety of real social costs, such as time, e⁄orts, and money wasted
as the taxpayer attempts to ensure he will get away with cheating. These costs include, but are not
limited to, for instance, foregone interest payments, more frequent contacts with tax experts in an
attempt to discover smarter concealment technologies. Chen (2003) assumes that these costs also
encompass private expenditures, such as bribes paid to government tax collectors. Our view of this,
however, is more consistent with that of Cremer and Gahvari (1994), who state: "Expenditures to
conceal tax evasion may entail "bribes" as well as real resource costs. Bribes are income transfers
with no e¢ ciency loss, unless their existence results in rent-seeking activities." In addition, we
would like to emphasize another type of costs relevant for Australia, where it is traditionally a
common practice for some local businesses to accept only cash transactions. The cash transactions
would discourage cash-constrained consumers who might be reluctant to withdraw even a small
amount of cash from their credit card accounts because of immediately charged high interests.16
Hence, such failed transactions would lead to additional excess burden shared by everyone in the
economy.
The taxpayer￿ s ￿ ow budget constraint becomes
dk(t) =
￿￿




dt + [￿￿e(t)y(t)]dz(t); (9)
where c(t) is real per capita consumption at time t, ￿ > 0 is the instantaneous standard deviation
parameter, and z(t) obeys a Wiener process.17 Clearly, the second term on the right-hand side of
15The strictly convex cost structure which we assume here is not arbitrarily chosen. In fact, Cowell (1990) proves
within a simple expected utility framework that the taxpayer￿ s willingness to invest in concealment technologies,
enabling him to get away with tax evasion, must be a strictly convex function of the evasion rate. Chen (2003)
also assumes the same cost structure as we do. Furthermore, in a developed country like Australia with relatively
well-developed third party reporting system and advanced monitoring technologies, it is only reasonable to assume a
typical taxpayer will ￿nd it excessively costly to conceal his income from the government tax authorities.
16Of course, this e⁄ect might be mitigated by the fact that these businesses are usually o⁄ering a cheaper service
for cash.
17This Merton-type budget equation here closely follows Lin and Yang￿ s (2001) extension but with a correction
o⁄ered by Dzhumashev and Gahramanov (2009). In fact, Lin and Yang (2001) were ￿rst to analyze a simple stochastic
growth model with tax evasion, but only with Ak(t) production function. Dzhumashev and Gahramanov (2009) also
argued that Lin and Yang failed to reconcile Inconsistency 1.
7expression (9) involves both the tax and evasion rate, which jointly contribute to the variability to
the path followed by k(t).
Obviously, within a sustainable growth setting in the context of tax evasion we have two control












(8); (9) and k(0) = k0; (11)
where E0 is the conditional expectation operator given k0, and ￿ > 0 is the discount rate. In a large
economy the level of public services is negligibly a⁄ected by the taxpayer￿ s actions and ￿ = g(t)=y(t)
is given in a steady-state. The optimization problem leads to the stochastic Bellman equation

































2 y (t) ￿ 2￿J
0 (k)
: (14)
Inserting (13) and (14) into the right-hand side of (12), leads to






￿ 1 + J
0































2 y (t) ￿ 2￿J
0 (k)
: (15)






























































18The representative taxpayer￿ s problem is equivalent to the second-best welfare maximization excercise with the
social planner ignorring the externalities (see Barro (1990) and Chen (2003)).
8Therefore, utilizing (13) and (14), the taxpayer can derive his control variables:





2 y (t) + 2￿k(t)
: (18)
Now let us temporarily relax the assumption of costly evasion to be consistent with a static





Remark 2. In the stochastic dynamic setting, the evasion rate is proportional to the capital-
output ratio. Two di⁄erent economic environments with di⁄erent role of the government spending
should generate di⁄erent capital-output ratios, and hence, ceteris paribus, the noncompliance rate
would be di⁄erent in general-equilibrium.
Remark 2 cannot follow from a static model as we have seen the evasion rate there is constant
at all times and no matter how public spending augments private production. Further note, it
is not su¢ cient to simply develop a stochastic growth model to come up with Remark 2. If one
considers y (t) = Ak(t) technology even in our model, expression (19) will always be constant like
in the static case.
Now, assume again ￿ > 0. Then what about an impact of the tax rate on the economy-wide
evasion rate? The answer is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 A change in the tax rate ambiguously a⁄ects the general-equilibrium evasion
rate.













￿ r = 0: (20)









￿ (1 ￿ re(t))
1￿2￿
￿ (￿ ￿ re(t))
￿
e(t)(1 ￿ re(t))










which con￿rms the proposition.
Hence, our model does not guarantee that we will obtain a positive relationship between taxes
and noncompliance incentives as (21) is impossible to sign. That is, we still can potentially end up
running into Yitzhaki￿ s puzzle. In fact, once a general-equilibrium circular-￿ ow e⁄ect is allowed for,
little is clear about the signs of other comparative statics. To see this let us derive the comparative
statics for the change in other important enforcement parameters, ￿ (the probability of detection),
9and ￿ (the penalty rate). Theoretical studies typically con￿rm that tougher penalties and higher
probability of detection discourage noncompliance. It is, of course, the case in a basic static model
(just di⁄erentiate expression (3) with respect to ￿ and ￿). We state here the following proposition.
Proposition 2 A change in the penalty rate, ￿, and the probability of detection, ￿, can increase
or decrease the general-equilibrium evasion rate.

























































which con￿rms the proposition.
At most we can see if the above two expressions happen to be negative (e.g., when the starting
value of ￿ is large enough), then @e(t)=@￿ < @e(t)=@￿ in absolute terms, which shows that a
change in the probability of being caught is more e⁄ective in deterring noncompliance. This is in
conformity with many empirical ￿ndings. But to make exact inferences, we need to calibrate the
model fully. We render that in the next section.
3 Calibration
3.1 Benchmark scenario and sensitivity analysis
In this section we describe the calibration of our extended model, and report our quantitative
￿ndings to con￿rm some of the salient features of Australian economy. It is typically assumed that
the random return on a unit of tax evaded is around 0.90 (Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007)). Hepburn
(1992) reports that in Australia the probability of detection and the penalty rate is 0.11 and 1.39,
respectively, and we do likewise. This leads to the expected return rate, r, equal to 0.8471, which
happens to be very close to that in Chen (2003). We follow the Hepburn￿ s tax rate variable, and
set it to 0.3734 since this number is close to the marginal tax rate of an average Australian worker
for the past few decades as reported by the Treasury.
We set the rate of time preference, ￿, to 2% which is consistent with the range normally assumed
in this line of literature. The standard deviation of the normalized process of the random return
on tax evasion, ￿, can be approximated via the expression ￿
p
￿ (1 ￿ ￿) (see Dzhumashev and
Gahramanov (2009) for details), which becomes 0.1892. We set the degree of the government
externality, 1 ￿ ￿, to 0.30 but we do a sensitivity analysis in regards with this parameter.19 With
19In fact, ￿ is a parameter which is rather di¢ cult to pin down precisely, and there is much disagreement about its
size among economists (e.g., Costa et al. (1987), Aschauer (1989), Munnell (1990), Ford and Poret (1991), Garcia-
MilÆ and McGuire (1992), Tatom (1991), Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero (1993), Sturm and de Haan (1995), Lau
and Sin (1997)). Also there is a theoretical possibility that causality might run not from public investment to output
and productivity, but the other way around (Fernald 1999), which further adds to mixed results. However, Otto and
Voss (1994b) showed that in Australia shocks to private output have no signi￿cant feedback e⁄ects on public capital.
In addition, available empirical studies often employ alternative speci￿cations and di⁄erent production functions, so
10logarithmic preferences, all remains now is to pick the values for A and ￿. In order to produce
the evasion rate of about 7.11% (as in Hepburn (1992)) and the growth rate of economy (to be
elaborated on later), ￿, of about 2.1%, we set A equal to 0.2003 and ￿ equal to 2.225.20 The
parameters are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1.
Parameter name Symbol Value
Probability of detection ￿ 0.11
Penalty rate ￿ 1.39
Tax rate ￿ 0.3734
Rate of time preference ￿ 0.02
Coe¢ cient of productivity A 0.2003
Degree of government externality 1 ￿ ￿ 0.30
Coe¢ cient of evasion costs ￿ 2.225
Variance ￿2 0.1892
Return rate on evasion r 0.8471
The magnitude of the evasion cost parameter can seriously mitigate the evasion incentives. In
general, doubling the cost parameter, ￿, decreases the evasion rate almost proportionally. Even with
an original value of ￿ = 2:225, assume an extremely attractive tax evasion gamble when ￿ = 100%,
and r is close to unity. Then the equilibrium evasion rate will be close to 22.5%. That is, 22.5%
can be interpreted as an upper bound for the evasion rate of a typical Australian taxpayer, which
is intuitively sensible as in a developed country with a sound tax system dodging more and more
taxes can become increasingly transparent to government tax o¢ cials, who traditionally have little
tolerance for such an illegal activity. With high evasion rates the taxpayer should require then
signi￿cant investments in concealment technologies.21
The parameter values are summarized in Table 1. All the values are available from literature,
except the technology parameter, A, and evasion cost parameter, ￿, which we calibrate within the
model. Our benchmark parameterization suggests the share of evasion costs in income, ￿e2 (t),
becomes about 1.12%, which is only slightly higher than that in Chen (2003), and is much more
conservative than what is assumed in the experimental study of Bayer and Sutter (2008). Our
it might be less clear-cut how the estimates they provide refer to the ￿ parameter we use in this study. Our reading of
the available literature concerning Australia generally suggests optimistic results about the role of productive public
investments in enhancing the real output. According to Otto and Voss (1994a), the elasticity of the ratio of output to
private capital with respect to the ratio of public to private capital exceeds 0.40 in Australia, while Kam and Wang
(2008) ￿nd it to be equal roughly to 0.35. Kamps (2005) reports 1 ￿ ￿ as roughly 0.30. We decide to use the lower
bound of the estimate since in our model g (t) is rather total taxes collected, not all of which are productive in reality.
Furthermore, our guess for 1 ￿ ￿ falls comfortably in the midpoint of the con￿ icting range typically reported for the
estimates on the private output elasticity of public capital (Otto and Voss (1995)).
20We deliberately choose Hepburn￿ s estimate of the cash-based income tax evasion in Australia as it is close to
the mid-point of the numbers reported by di⁄erent sources. Bajada (1999), for example, estimates that income
underreporting in Australia is as high as 15% of GDP, while Breusch (2005) argues that it is much smaller in fact,
roughly about 2% of GDP. We should mention that adjusting the values for the compliance and cost parameters
along their feasible and reasonable values is capable of hitting both latter ￿gures within our model, but in so doing,
we veri￿ed that the results hereafter would not be a⁄ected signi￿cantly, and hence we move on with our existing
parameterization.
21In addition, we should emphasize that ￿ is an unobservable parameter, and the present value of it implies rather
steep evasion cost function. The value of ￿ should not necessarily be bound to be that large. For instance, if we
assume the fraction of income hidden in Australia is as high as that reported in Bajada (1999), we can even consider
the value of ￿ slightly below 1.
11benchmark calibration results in the steady-state share of government tax revenues in output being
equal to 35.09%, which is a few percentage points larger than that reported in Gal￿ (1994).22
3.1.1 Comparative statics revisited
We can now turn our attention to Yitzhaki￿ s puzzle and investigate the compliance behavior for
di⁄erent tax rates. Substituting the above values into equation (21) we ￿nd @e(t)=@￿ ￿0.19. At
the existing evasion and tax rates, a unit increase in the latter increases noncompliance rate by less
than a unity. To see if such a pattern holds within a su¢ ciently large vicinity of the current state
of the Australian economy, we ￿x all the parameter values in Table 1 except the tax rate, which
now is allowed to take discrete jumps from the closed interval [0%;100%] (step size is chosen to be






















Figure 1: Blue line re￿ects the relationship between the tax rate and the evasion rate for the benchmark parameterization.
The present state of Australian economy with the tax 37.34% and the evasion rate 7.11% is labelled by the black dot.
We see a very clear positive association between taxes and noncompliance when the tax rate
varies from zero all the way up to 100%. Repeating our exercise for other reasonable values of ￿, ￿
and ￿ we get a similar positive association between taxes and evasion, and Thus, we do not report
those results here. In the economy with tax evasion the government therefore would be unable to
render the private income zero even by imposing the heaviest statutory tax burden.
We should point out here that in Figure 1 when taxes are nil, so are the evasion incentives.
However, one should not conclude that such an extreme ￿scal freedom is going to render the
magnitude of hidden economy zero. Our model refers to tax evasion only as a proxy for the hidden
economy, but does not capture a variety of potential country-speci￿c social considerations, which
would support a minimum level of underground economy even in the absence of any taxes. Such
a "natural rate of hidden economy" might in fact be non-trivial in size, and Giles and Caragata
(2001) report it to be between 4 to 4.5 percent of GDP in New Zealand, where the long-run estimate
of the hidden economy ratio exceeds 8 percent of measured output (Giles (1999)).
22For simplicity, of course, we assume that the government budget is balanced.
12Turning our attention to the enforcement parameters, ￿ and ￿, we can evaluate the signs of (22)
and (23) by using our benchmark calibration parameters. Consequently, @e(t)=@￿ and @e(t)=@￿
become -0.12 and -0.01, respectively, which shows indeed that a change in the probability of being
caught is more e⁄ective in deterring evasion than a change in the penalty rate.23 Importantly, the
numbers we get conform empirical ￿ndings. The detection probability tend to suppress noncom-
pliance, albeit not too aggressively (see, e.g., Fischer et al. (1992) and references therein), while
tougher penalties do not signi￿cantly impact tax compliance behavior (see, e.g., Baldry (1984),
Fortin et al. (2007)). On the contrary, considering the static case and using our benchmark pa-
rameterization results in @e
@￿ ￿ -5.98 and @e
@￿ ￿-9.82. Hence, unlike our dynamic model, the static
model predicts a much more optimistic e⁄ect of traditional enforcement parameters on tax evasion,
and asserts that penalties are more e⁄ective in combatting tax evasion incentives than detection
probabilities. In both static and dynamic models, a change in the probability of detection lowers
the return rate, r = 1￿￿￿, by a larger magnitude than a change in the penalty rate does. However,
in the dynamic model with productive government expenditures, g (t) increases when r falls at any
given level of income, and the rise in g (t) is larger when ￿ goes up. Hence, the general equilibrium
e⁄ect of an increase of the probability of detection on the the evasion rate is larger.
3.2 Computation of the optimal tax rate
In the above scenario for arguments￿sake we used benchmark parameterization to replicate some
observed features of the Australian economy. Hence, the tax rate was exogenously determined and
other parameters conveniently produced the observed noncompliance and the growth rates. Now
we turn our attention to ￿nding the optimal value for the statutory tax rate, maximizing the utility
of a representative household, given the government-taxpayer interaction. It is well-known that
such a welfare maximization boils down to the maximization of per capita consumption. Our aim
is to see how close the present state of the Australian economy comes to that characterized by the
theoretical model. We adopt the following de￿nition.
De￿nition The optimal equilibrium tax rate, ￿￿, is de￿ned as
￿￿ ￿ argmaxf￿ (￿)g; (24)
with











￿ (￿ (1 ￿ re(t)))
1￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿; (25)
and when the following conditions are simultaneously satis￿ed: (i) the individual optimization con-
ditions, (17), and (18), ii) the individual budget equation, (9), and iii) the government￿ s budget
equation, (6).
The function ￿ represents the mean growth rate of capital and consumption (and therefore, of
the economy since there are no transitional dynamics), which can be found by substituting (17)
into (9), and taking the expected value of the right-hand side, while ensuring (18) always holds.
Since we do not have an explicit expression for the equilibrium evasion rate, the maximization of
the ￿-function with respect to ￿ does not permit an analytical solution. Thus, we conduct the
numerical computation of the optimal statutory tax rate.
23Since the value of ￿ is greater than re(t), expressions (22) and (23) will both be negative, and thus we are not
illustrating them graphically.
13Figure 2 re￿ ects our computation of the optimal tax rate and resulting equilibrium evasion rate
for three di⁄erent levels of the government externality, 1 ￿ ￿, with ￿=0.70 as in the benchmark
























Figure 2: Blue line is for the economy with ￿=0.70 as in the benchmark scenario. Broken line is for the economy with
￿=0.80. Solid black line is for the economy with ￿=0.90. All three lines meet at the black dot, which represents the present
state of Australian economy, with the resulting tax rate and evasion rate equal to 37.34% and 7.11%, respectively, and with the
resulting growth rate of 2.1%. Red rhombs represent the optimal states of the economy for di⁄erent values of ￿.
When we consider ￿ equal to 0.90 and 0.80, our evasion rate is very close to 7.1%, and Thus, we
just adjust the technology parameter to 0.0940 and 0.1377, respectively, to hit the target growth
rate of 2.1% (and the evasion rate then rises to 7.11%). This ensures all three curves in Figure
2 intersect at the black dot, which has the same interpretation as in Figure 1. With a relatively
low degree of the government expenditure externality (￿=0.90), solid black line reaches its peak at
the statutory tax rate equal to only 10 percent, with the corresponding growth rate of 3 percent,
and evasion rate 1.9 percent. With higher public expenditure externalities (￿ equal to 0.80 or
0.70 as in the benchmark) the optimal tax rate becomes 20 and 30 percents, respectively, with the
corresponding evasion rates of 3.81 and 5.71 percents. With ￿ equal to 0.80 and 0.70, the optimal
growth rate of the economy is about 2.5 and 2.2 percents, respectively. Other things being equal,
the greater the productivity of the government is, the more tax revenues are required to capitalize
on those bene￿ts. Thus, the optimal marginal tax rate in the benchmark scenario is 30% (and the
excess burden of evasion as a fraction of income, ￿e2 (t), would only be 0.73 percent of income). It
might, therefore, be tempting to say that our model essentially replicates Barro￿ s (1990) optimality
condition, where the degree of the government spending externality, 1 ￿ ￿, equals to the welfare-
maximizing statutory tax rate. However, this is not the case. If we decrease 1 ￿ ￿ parameter to
0.50, then the optimal tax rate becomes slightly higher, namely 51%. If we set 1 ￿ ￿ to 0.80, the
optimal tax rate would become 85%. If 1 ￿ ￿ further rises to 0.90, the optimal tax rate is 91%.
As was previously mentioned, the presence of tax evasion induces the welfare-maximizing gov-
ernment to increase the tax rate in order to achieve the optimal level of public revenues. But higher
taxes stimulate evasion, which adds to the excess burden driven by noncompliance, inducing the
government to lower the tax rate. On the other hand, large resource wastes mean lower tax base,
tempting the government to increase taxes to ￿nance given expenditure levels. Finally, recall that
14taxes (and evasion) in our model further distort the taxpayer￿ s behavior by adding noise to the
path of individual capital pro￿le.
We see the interplay of di⁄erent forces can move ￿￿ to either direction, and there is no a
priori reason to expect higher or lower tax rates at various evasion-externality combinations. This
becomes clear in Figure 3 below, where on the horizontal axis we plot the evasion rate, and on
the vertical axis we label the optimal tax rates and the degree of public sector externality.24 We
allow evasion rate to take initial values of 2 and 15 percents, which is consistent with the range
empirically pinned down for Australia. We then, for the sake of illustration, assume higher evasion









































Figure 3: Colored straight lines indicate di⁄erent degrees of public expenditure externality. The star symbols indicate the
optimal statutory tax rates calculated within our model for these degrees of government externality.
For instance, blue solid line represents the economy where the degree of government externality is
60%. Corresponding blue stars are the optimal general-equilibrium statutory tax rates for di⁄erent
target noncompliance rates. When, for example, the evasion rate is 35% and 1 ￿ ￿ is 0.60, ￿￿ is
only 50.5%. Consider now our benchmark value (black line with 1 ￿ ￿ =30%). We see black stars
remarkably closely overlap with the straight line at various evasion rates. Hence, for reasonable
values of evasion and public sector externality degrees, we ￿nd that the statutory tax rate can be set
according to the natural condition for productive e¢ ciency proposed by Barro (1990). That is, the
mere existence of noncompliance cannot serve as an e¢ ciency argument to justify ￿scal expansion.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the income tax evasion phenomenon within an endogenous stochastic
growth model with costly compliance. The calibration of our model to some of the salient features
of Australian economy predicts a realistic evasion rate. The resource costs wasted in the process of
tax noncompliance are calculated to be around one percent of income. We also were able to avoid
a non-sensible positive relationship between taxes and compliance incentives present in traditional
models. The numerical estimation shows that a cut in the marginal income tax rate by a few
percentage points will be both growth-enhancing, and evasion-reducing.
24Again, we adjust ￿ and A values accordingly to get the target 2.1% growth rate of the economy.
15Since two economic environments with di⁄erent roles of the government spending in private
production should in principle lead to di⁄erent capital-output ratio, the non-compliance rate will
vary across the economies. This is very important as when the government collects taxes it also gives
something back in return. The latter activity surely should exert some in￿ uence on noncompliance.
Static models, unlike ours, ￿nd no such in￿ uence (unless the utility function is augmented with
public spending in a special way like in Cowell and Gordon (1988)).
Finally, it has been argued by Chen (2003) that income taxation must be more aggressive when
tax evasion is present. That is, the optimal tax rate must be higher than Barro￿ s natural e¢ ciency
condition. A political implication would be that the government can always call for a heavier
taxation as a necessary reaction for noncompliance. Our model shows, however, for a wide range
of reasonable simulations, the income tax rate should not exceed the degree of the government
expenditure externality for private production. That is, ￿scal expansion should be limited by the
usefulness of government revenues in the ￿rst place.
To ￿nalize, we wish to consider some caveats. We would like to stress that in our paper
we purely focus on e¢ ciency issues of personal income tax and disregard distributional aspects
and other non-income taxation mechanisms. However, one might argue that lowering marginal
income tax rates and correspondingly adjusting consumption taxation to ensure a revenue-neutral
tax mix change might in fact contribute to the equity and compliance of the Australian personal
tax system (Mathews (1980), Swan (1984), Groenewegen (1984), (1985)). However, according to
Kesselman￿ s (1993) counter-argument, such a shift between two taxation schemes can be equity
and compliance-detrimental as industry sectors evading previously on their income taxes, would
switch to evading more on indirect taxes on their corresponding value added. Furthermore, besides
individual responses to changes in tax structure, the response of trade unions is important as well.
It has been argued that a simple revenue-neutral reduction in the marginal rate of income tax and
a simultaneous increase in consumption tax would increase the wage demands of all trade unions,
provided that unions are willing to trade employment for wages (Creedy (1992)). Then a rise in
the income tax threshold might be needed to curtail the unions￿wage aspirations (Creedy and
McDonald (1990)).25
Even if the focus were on an income taxation scheme alone, the extent of tax evasion would
be capable of a⁄ecting the redistributive e⁄ect of a progressive tax schedule, which we ignored in
order not lose analytical tractability. Freire-SerØn and PanadØs (2008) proved that for a given pro-
gressive tax function, tax evasion modi￿es the distribution of the after-tax income depending upon
the attitude of the taxpayer toward absolute risk aversion. In addition, another worthwhile exten-
sion would be to decompose the tax rate variable into personal, indirect and corporate segments
and analyze the implications for the hidden economy and growth maximization. An interesting
methodology regarding this argument is presented in Scully (1996) and Caragata and Giles (2000).
We believe extending our modelling technique with appropriate maximization arguments for tax
policy to account for the above arguments should open interesting avenues for further debates.
25Though, in Australia the overall power of unions has been notably decreasing since past decades.
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